CONTINUOUS INTERNET TELEMETRY24H DRIFT41,685 material changesacross 38,305 domains · 24h to ~2h ago · +7,068 vs yesterdaySHIFT42 domains moved DNS from koaladns.com to magpiedns.coma coordinated move · 24hNOW539 curated domains not reachablelast probe, steadySITE ERRORS33,856 sites serving errorslast probe · 5xx / 404 / TLSBOT DEFENSEbot defense observed on 149,215 sites429 rate-limit / 403 bot-block, a posture signal

yoshiko.su

Observed Aug 2, 2026, 08:32 UTC (3d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.

This reading of yoshiko.su was taken 3d ago

yoshiko.su is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting yoshiko.su under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.

Watch yoshiko.su Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Up right now
Secured byLet's Encrypt
IPv6 · 1 subdomain · tranco
Every line above is a signed observation. Check the math at the bottom of the page.
EVIDENCE OF WILDCARD DNSobserved 2026-08-03 04:49 UTC

DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.

Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.

This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.

INFRASTRUCTURE MAPwhat yoshiko.su actually stands on - every host below is a signed observation
yoshiko.su
A / AAAA
92.53.96.2452a03:6f00:1::5c35:60f5
2a03serves the site
NS
ns1.timeweb.runs2.timeweb.runs4.timeweb.orgns3.timeweb.org
timeweb.ru + timeweb.organswers its DNS
MX
mx1.timeweb.rumx2.timeweb.ru
timeweb.rureceives its email
TLS
yoshiko.su
Let's Encryptissued its certificate

DNS Records

A 1

  • 92.53.96.245

AAAA 1

  • 2a03:6f00:1::5c35:60f5

MX 2

  • 10mx1.timeweb.ru
  • 20mx2.timeweb.ru

TXT 1

  • v=spf1 include:_spf.timeweb.ru ~all

NS 4

  • ns1.timeweb.ru
  • ns2.timeweb.ru
  • ns4.timeweb.org
  • ns3.timeweb.org

SOA 1

  • ns1.timeweb.ru dns.timeweb.ru

DMARC_RECORDS 1

  • v=DMARC1; p=reject;

TLS Certificates (3)

Common NameIssuerExpires
yoshiko.su C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=YR2 Mon, 07 Sep 2026 19:55:05 +0000
YR2 C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YR Sat, 02 Sep 2028 23:59:59 +0000
Root YR C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000

Subdomains (1)

The proof

Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.

Verify this receipt

Ed25519 Receipt

Receipt ID
rcpt_067277af0d648fbc
Output Hash
b283b10d8084c8f48f23e855d75fa8b80a24aee86da526e980f99c51a4e12de7
Signature
ed25519:c155ff1ee6b5fca53ef4c14bc56a43aa62abdf19f8f0af836b3f914cad6cc9dea54d4a8b8aed484186b3ac14d5ebce307367e11fd4ef20ec8b0c2f05d237bb02
Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9
Parent
(genesis)
Plane
fast
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