CONTINUOUS INTERNET TELEMETRY24H DRIFT31,420 material changesacross 29,745 domains · 24h to ~45m agoSHIFT22 domains moved DNS from brainydns.com to koaladns.coma coordinated move · 24hNOW560 curated domains not reachablelast probe, steadySITE ERRORS34,162 sites serving errorslast probe · 5xx / 404 / TLSBOT DEFENSEbot defense observed on 156,262 sites429 rate-limit / 403 bot-block, a posture signal

zdenekskrobak.com

Observed Aug 2, 2026, 18:27 UTC (1d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.

This reading of zdenekskrobak.com was taken 1d ago

zdenekskrobak.com is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting zdenekskrobak.com under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.

Watch zdenekskrobak.com Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Up right now
Secured byLet's Encrypt
IPv6 · 1 subdomain · domcop
Every line above is a signed observation. Check the math at the bottom of the page.
EVIDENCE OF WILDCARD DNSobserved 2026-08-02 18:27 UTC

DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.

Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.

This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.

INFRASTRUCTURE MAPwhat zdenekskrobak.com actually stands on - every host below is a signed observation
zdenekskrobak.com
A / AAAA
62.109.154.1622001:1ab0:7e1e:151:62:109:154:162
2001serves the site
NS
ns1.webglobe.czns2.webglobe.czns3.webglobe.com
webglobe.cz + webglobe.comanswers its DNS
MX
mx.ebola.cz
ebola.czreceives its email
TLS
www.zdenekskrobak.com
Let's Encryptissued its certificate

DNS Records

A 1

  • 62.109.154.162

AAAA 1

  • 2001:1ab0:7e1e:151:62:109:154:162

MX 1

  • 10mx.ebola.cz

TXT 1

  • v=spf1 include:_netblocks.ebola.cz ~all

NS 3

  • ns1.webglobe.cz
  • ns2.webglobe.cz
  • ns3.webglobe.com

SOA 1

  • ns1.webglobe.cz admin.ebola.cz

MCP_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 include:_netblocks.ebola.cz ~all

DMARC_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 include:_netblocks.ebola.cz ~all

BIMI_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 include:_netblocks.ebola.cz ~all

MTA_STS_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 include:_netblocks.ebola.cz ~all

TLS Certificates (3)

Common NameIssuerExpires
www.zdenekskrobak.com C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=YR2 Tue, 27 Oct 2026 04:33:28 +0000
YR2 C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YR Sat, 02 Sep 2028 23:59:59 +0000
Root YR C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000

Subdomains (1)

The proof

Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; nothing leaves your machine.

Verify this receipt

Ed25519 Receipt

Receipt ID
rcpt_b63b229783cb5d5a
Output Hash
530c25bcf9f34e42e5fcd81aaba51d724009b98210635f9b896a23d264256008
Signature
ed25519:48939458228e48eafbe0cea87fbe7ae00cae2e553b17f8f02be23f07c9d44e2d41f569cee0dfbc84f33820a748ccfdb224212a2e23c73482ccef6213a8a1840f
Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9
Parent
(genesis)
Plane
fast
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