CONTINUOUS INTERNET TELEMETRY24H DRIFT71,617 material changesacross 67,026 domains · 24h to ~35m ago · +37,000 vs yesterdayROTATION57 domains moved DNS from koaladns.com to magpiedns.com, 56 moved backa rotation loop, not a migration · 24hNOW533 curated domains not reachablelast probe, steadySITE ERRORS33,847 sites serving errorslast probe · 5xx / 404 / TLSBOT DEFENSEbot defense observed on 126,417 sites429 rate-limit / 403 bot-block, a posture signal

zenicki.net

Observed Jul 26, 2026, 09:58 UTC (10d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.

This reading of zenicki.net was taken 10d ago

zenicki.net is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting zenicki.net under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.

Watch zenicki.net Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Up right now
Secured byDigiCert
majestic
Every line above is a signed observation. Check the math at the bottom of the page.
EVIDENCE OF WILDCARD DNSobserved 2026-08-04 04:39 UTC

DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.

Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.

This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.

INFRASTRUCTURE MAPwhat zenicki.net actually stands on - every host below is a signed observation
zenicki.net
A / AAAA
64.190.63.222
unattributedserves the site
NS
ns1.sedoparking.comns2.sedoparking.com
sedoparking.comanswers its DNS
MX
localhost
localhostreceives its email
TLS
zenicki.net
DigiCert Incissued its certificate

DNS Records

A 1

  • 64.190.63.222

MX 1

  • 0localhost

TXT 5

  • v=spf1 -all
  • v=spf1 -all
  • v=spf1 -all
  • v=spf1 -all
  • v=spf1 -all

NS 2

  • ns1.sedoparking.com
  • ns2.sedoparking.com

SOA 1

  • ns1.sedoparking.com hostmaster.sedo.de

TLS Certificates (2)

Common NameIssuerExpires
zenicki.net C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, 2.5.4.11=www.digicert.com, CN=Encryption Everywhere DV TLS CA - G2 Fri, 23 Oct 2026 23:59:59 +0000
Encryption Everywhere DV TLS CA - G2 C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, 2.5.4.11=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Global Root G2 Sat, 27 Nov 2027 12:46:40 +0000

Subdomains (0)

None observed.

The proof

Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.

Verify this receipt

Ed25519 Receipt

Receipt ID
rcpt_796cf9a44a1bf150
Output Hash
a1fe518ca2475b48cc697001d0178b96c2bad782cda51d83c2885e0713e8e014
Signature
ed25519:bb784e3dd5ceddcb2e8c438a923aee3b88152a527d459b895d3060909964b4f72c4d2aeef5c95197dda6e83120898a459dbfa45bb1eba446ec2c6b4ef026fa01
Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9
Parent
(genesis)
Plane
fast
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