bgov.com
Observed Aug 11, 2026, 04:22 UTC (6d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
bgov.com is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting bgov.com under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch bgov.com Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.Steady. No change on record for bgov.com in the last day; this reading matches the one before it. The steady record is signed like every other reading. Watch it to catch the next move the moment it lands.
DNS Records
A 2
15.197.188.10699.83.181.117
MX 4
0mgcnj1.bloomberg.com0mgcnj2.bloomberg.com0mgcny1.bloomberg.com0mgcny2.bloomberg.com
TXT 14
815051e4dc3b4a978696ffbc2ff3b6f3MS=ms72964943_i16iibqv1yzuhq4hb4us0qm8a2kv2w6amazonses:+FgY9/xa5aXyToAL0fpYbHggHNeFFyz3loIxq2fbilY=amazonses:3dWIzt27LqQTn0n0yFH89WSUSq+pmnF6B3UoejExN7o=amazonses:Gpu44gxZXCtRJJz4EJZNGsevbDzNFt2rSgPGqhIZzZc=amazonses:KYZIvVXW7+DS0tCRpPQczeS6uCFD5inkjKFVVcGZy88=amazonses:RM4lfCicKd0rX4WwaRVtbGlMAZd8Dk/5/Ls5lgPqm4Q=amazonses:Rn3kNhtcuDtbBCOdRUZPblHKmgK+lOUmihGUd8dHBeo=ciscocidomainverification=6ae365b1da578f418d08e6395dce16e6a31f2527f45dd3eb9b9fe6dcf57b98d2
NS 4
ns-1160.awsdns-17.orgns-1935.awsdns-49.co.ukns-372.awsdns-46.comns-956.awsdns-55.net
SOA 1
ns-1935.awsdns-49.co.uk awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com
CAA 2
issue "amazon.com"issue "digicert.com"
MCP_RECORDS 2
spf2.0/pra -allv=spf1 -all
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=DMARC1; p=none; adkim=r; aspf=r; ruf=mailto:dmarc-ruf@dmarc-bloomberg.com; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc-rua@dmarc-bloomberg.com
BIMI_RECORDS 2
spf2.0/pra -allv=spf1 -all
MTA_STS_RECORDS 2
spf2.0/pra -allv=spf1 -all
TLS Certificates (3)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
www.bgov.com |
C=US, O=Amazon, CN=Amazon RSA 2048 M01 | Thu, 26 Nov 2026 23:59:59 +0000 |
Amazon RSA 2048 M01 |
C=US, O=Amazon, CN=Amazon Root CA 1 | Fri, 23 Aug 2030 22:21:28 +0000 |
Amazon Root CA 1 |
C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., CN=Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority - G2 | Thu, 31 Dec 2037 01:00:00 +0000 |
Subdomains (1)
DomainDrift asked this domain for one hostname that nobody ever registered, and it answered. A domain that answers invented hostnames is running wildcard DNS. It is common and usually deliberate. A SaaS platform gives every customer a subdomain this way. How the check works
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_15c9f7946a1639b0- Output Hash
bbe5e91c8467f75f6b6ca5aeec8c630ccdfb6dd6b5da54b5d068a94b790dd526- Signature
ed25519:9eea8f8d8b1b379e963ad476e8cb659d44077296368572d0bcb10e9e9ef36fd07febf6f35127d0fb882f8d01a4ee3d01ad21a1f60368dfceb527ae1de1c71003- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast