CONTINUOUS INTERNET TELEMETRY24H DRIFT51,721 material changesacross 48,306 domains · 24h to ~85m ago · -10,355 vs yesterdayROTATION55 domains moved DNS from kirklanddc.com to koaladns.com, 53 moved backa rotation loop, not a migration · 24hREGISTRAR DRIFT1 changed registrar24hNOW531 curated domains not reachablelast probe, steadySITE ERRORS33,897 sites serving errorslast probe · 5xx / 404 / TLSBOT DEFENSEbot defense observed on 119,904 sites429 rate-limit / 403 bot-block, a posture signal

ctyme.com

Observed Jul 24, 2026, 19:33 UTC (13d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.

This reading of ctyme.com was taken 13d ago

ctyme.com is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting ctyme.com under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.

Watch ctyme.com Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Not responding
Signed observation on record.
tranco_100k
Every line above is a signed observation. Check the math at the bottom of the page.
EVIDENCE OF WILDCARD DNSobserved 2026-08-06 08:03 UTC

DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.

Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.

This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.

INFRASTRUCTURE MAPwhat ctyme.com actually stands on - every host below is a signed observation
ctyme.com
A / AAAA
184.105.182.100
unattributedserves the site
NS
ns.reality-dns.netns.reality-dns.orgns.reality-dns.com
reality-dns.net + reality-dns.org + moreanswers its DNS
MX
mx.junkemailfilter.commx.junkemailfilter.netmx.junkemailfilter.org
junkemailfilter.com + junkemailfilter.net + morereceives its email
TLS
ctyme.com
Let's Encryptissued its certificate

DNS Records

A 1

  • 184.105.182.100

MX 3

  • 10mx.junkemailfilter.com
  • 20mx.junkemailfilter.net
  • 30mx.junkemailfilter.org

TXT 5

  • v=spf1 include:junkemailfilter.com ~all
  • v=spf1 include:junkemailfilter.com ~all
  • v=spf1 include:junkemailfilter.com ~all
  • v=spf1 include:junkemailfilter.com ~all
  • v=spf1 include:junkemailfilter.com ~all

NS 3

  • ns.reality-dns.net
  • ns.reality-dns.org
  • ns.reality-dns.com

SOA 1

  • ns.reality-dns.com dns.reality-dns.com

TLS Certificates (3)

Common NameIssuerExpires
ctyme.com C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=YR2 Mon, 21 Sep 2026 09:49:10 +0000
YR2 C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YR Sat, 02 Sep 2028 23:59:59 +0000
Root YR C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000

Subdomains (1)

The proof

Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.

Verify this receipt

Ed25519 Receipt

Receipt ID
rcpt_d1cf27bbda6f6510
Output Hash
3a799dbe4ca07a95b60551efbf1da40b0c3369139c225166427be0075402a241
Signature
ed25519:f8bbaedf37919990e9e5c8347cce1a875357a6bfa19661322539f389f3f10299b85f423e60eea9dc49beb1c3afa1af943eee08aaa861f211d8ba992b2100b50f
Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9
Parent
(genesis)
Plane
fast
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