e-aukce.com
Observed Aug 2, 2026, 16:49 UTC (4d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
e-aukce.com is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting e-aukce.com under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch e-aukce.com Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 1
178.238.38.54
MX 1
10pmg.aira.cz
TXT 1
v=spf1 mx include:spf.aira.cz ip4:193.105.159.182 ?all
NS 3
nsa.aira.cznsb.aira.cznsc.aira.cz
SOA 1
nsa.aira.cz hostmaster.aira.cz
MCP_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 mx include:spf.aira.cz ip4:193.105.159.182 ?all
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; aspf=r; adkim=r;
BIMI_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 mx include:spf.aira.cz ip4:193.105.159.182 ?all
MTA_STS_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 mx include:spf.aira.cz ip4:193.105.159.182 ?all
TLS Certificates (3)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
www.drazby-exekutori.cz |
C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=YR2 | Wed, 30 Sep 2026 06:02:05 +0000 |
YR2 |
C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YR | Sat, 02 Sep 2028 23:59:59 +0000 |
Root YR |
C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 | Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000 |
Subdomains (1)
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_f0516fde2f071041- Output Hash
fae7f35dea54c3e62876666ce80772e216b3226abf20dce63786227bee90f184- Signature
ed25519:64e6967827cd05e212e9807cb5b66a4885789b2ff46c833329b419c129b6239b3ca7b17b6c4a62ffcbfc614204ebc7f3323341cb30a712f177fb40ea06828206- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast