CONTINUOUS INTERNET TELEMETRY24H DRIFT41,685 material changesacross 38,305 domains · 24h to ~2h ago · +7,068 vs yesterdaySHIFT42 domains moved DNS from koaladns.com to magpiedns.coma coordinated move · 24hNOW539 curated domains not reachablelast probe, steadySITE ERRORS33,856 sites serving errorslast probe · 5xx / 404 / TLSBOT DEFENSEbot defense observed on 149,215 sites429 rate-limit / 403 bot-block, a posture signal

ygselect.com

Observed Aug 3, 2026, 01:32 UTC (2d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.

This reading of ygselect.com was taken 2d ago

ygselect.com is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting ygselect.com under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.

Watch ygselect.com Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Up right now
Secured byLet's Encrypt
8 subdomains · tranco
Every line above is a signed observation. Check the math at the bottom of the page.
EVIDENCE OF WILDCARD DNSobserved 2026-08-04 17:35 UTC

DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.

Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.

This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.

INFRASTRUCTURE MAPwhat ygselect.com actually stands on - every host below is a signed observation
ygselect.com
A / AAAA
203.245.12.121183.111.139.227183.111.139.236203.245.12.115
unattributedserves the site
NS
ns2.cafe24.co.krns1.cafe24.comns2.cafe24.comns1.cafe24.co.kr
cafe24.co.kr + cafe24.comanswers its DNS
MX
ecwebmail-011.cafe24.com
cafe24.comreceives its email
TLS
cn.ygselect.com
Let's Encryptissued its certificate

DNS Records

A 4

  • 203.245.12.121
  • 183.111.139.227
  • 183.111.139.236
  • 203.245.12.115

MX 1

  • 10ecwebmail-011.cafe24.com

TXT 1

  • v=spf1 include:spf.cafe24.com ~all

NS 4

  • ns2.cafe24.co.kr
  • ns1.cafe24.com
  • ns2.cafe24.com
  • ns1.cafe24.co.kr

SOA 1

  • ygselect.com postmaster.ygselect.com

MCP_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 include:spf.cafe24.com ~all

DMARC_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 include:spf.cafe24.com ~all

BIMI_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 include:spf.cafe24.com ~all

MTA_STS_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 include:spf.cafe24.com ~all

TLS Certificates (3)

Common NameIssuerExpires
cn.ygselect.com C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=YR2 Sat, 24 Oct 2026 15:18:07 +0000
YR2 C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YR Sat, 02 Sep 2028 23:59:59 +0000
Root YR C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000

Subdomains (8)

The proof

Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.

Verify this receipt

Ed25519 Receipt

Receipt ID
rcpt_5a822144846edab1
Output Hash
32b43afa86af941d3a99321745bf259d07c1745e4ba93a19aeaaa90e5dabb171
Signature
ed25519:93c5551fd664f6b17e0a01e55bbaab4fa122d57bf35a79324f161f5eb4a90453dc2d0b60507f010fe6052b4f6aa910d19e7dc7f940d8ac2bde2dff92f94c330a
Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9
Parent
(genesis)
Plane
fast
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